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Abstract
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on social mobility in contemporary Britain among economists
and sociologists. Using the 1991 British Household Panel Survey and the 2005 General Household Survey,
we focus on the mobility trajectories of male and female respondents aged 25-59. In terms of absolute
mobility, we ﬁnd somewhat unfavourable trends in upward mobility for men although long-term mobility from
the working class into salariat positions is still in evidence. An increase in downward mobility is clearly
evident. In relation to women, we ﬁnd favourable trends in upward mobility and unchanging downward
mobility over the fourteen-year time period. With regard to relative mobility, we ﬁnd signs of greater ﬂuidity
in the overall pattern and declining advantages of the higher salariat origin for both men and women. We
consider these ﬁndings in relation to the public debate on social mobility and the academic response and
we note the different preoccupations of participants in the debate. We conclude by suggesting that the
interdisciplinary debate between economists and sociologists has been fruitful although a recognition of
similarities, and not simply differences in position, pushes knowledge and understanding forward.
Keywords: Social Class, Absolute and Relative Mobility, Gender Difference, Social
Fluidity
Introduction
1.1 In recent years, there has been increasing concern among politicians and media commentators that
social mobility is declining in Britain. This anxiety, for example, featured in the leadership and deputy
leadership contests of the Labour Government in 2007 won by Gordon Brown and Harriett Harman and led
to various policy initiatives, including the Equalities Bill published in 2009 and the formation of a Panel on
Fair Access to the Professions chaired by Alan Milburn, whose ﬁnal report, Unleashing Aspiration (2009),
called for a second wave of upward mobility to be facilitated by the growth of high-level professional and
managerial careers. Commissioned by Harman, the National Equality Panel report, An Anatomy of
Economic Inequality in the UK, also noted that social mobility is low (Hills et al. 2009). While in opposition,
the Liberal Democrat set up an Independent Social Mobility Commission in 2008 chaired by Martin Narey,
Barnado's Chief Executive, which reported that children's life chances are still closely tied to their parents'
class background. Finally, the Coalition Government's Education Secretary, Michael Gove, introduced the
Schools White paper in the House of Commons in November 2010, proposing a major overhaul of the
English school system, with reference to social mobility. He claimed, 'Social mobility went backwards
under Labour – and it is the mission of this Coalition Government to reverse that melancholy trend and
make opportunity more equal so we can become an aspiration nation once more. … The White Paper does
just that' (BBC Democracy Live, 24/11/2010). Politicians across the political spectrum, it seems, are
concerned and keen to do something about declining social mobility (Devine, 2009; Payne, 2009;
Saunders, 2009).[2]
1.2 As we shall see, this political and public anxiety has been fuelled by academic research and debate.
We contribute to the ongoing academic discussion of trends in intergenerational social mobility in
contemporary Britain by asking whether social mobility is really declining in recent decades. The paper is
organised along the following lines. In the next section, we outline the arguments by economists that social
mobility has declined since the 1970s and the counter-argument from sociologists that it has not done so.
We note, however, that the ﬁnding that men's upward mobility have levelled off or may even be declining
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methods. We draw on the 1991 British Household Panel Survey and the 2005 General Household Survey
and use the National Statistics Socio-economic Classiﬁcation (NS-SeC) to analyse patterns and trends
across the two surveys. In the fourth section, we present our ﬁndings on absolute mobility. For men, we
ﬁnd evidence of declining upward mobility although long-range mobility can still be found. Downward
mobility has increased. For women, we ﬁnd increasing upward mobility and largely stable downward
mobility. In the sixth section, we consider these ﬁndings in relation to the public debate on social mobility
and the academic response and we note the different preoccupations of participants in the debate. In the
conclusion we suggest that the interdisciplinary debate between economists and sociologists has been
fruitful although a recognition of similarities, and not simply differences in position, pushes knowledge and
understanding forward.
The Debate on social mobility
2.1 The impetus for concern about declining social mobility is associated with the work of economists,
some of which was conducted for the Sutton Trust and reported extensively in the media (Blanden et al.
2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, see also Machin and Vignoles 2004). Blanden et al. examined changes in
intergenerational mobility using longitudinal data from the 1958 National Child Development Study (NCDS)
and the 1970 National Cohort Study (BCS). They found that intergenerational income mobility had fallen for
those sons born in 1970 compared with those born in 1958. The percentage of sons in the lowest income
quartile whose parents were also in the lowest quartile rose from 31% in 1958 to 39% in 1970 while the
percentage of sons in the highest income quartile whose parents were also in the highest quartile rose from
34% among the 1958 cohort to 42% among the 1970 cohort (Blanden et al. 2004: 141). Thus, equality of
opportunity had declined across the two cohorts of young men. Blanden et al. argue that the decline is the
result of a closer relationship between family income and educational attainment between the two cohorts.
Drawing on additional data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), they found that more sons
and daughters from all families stayed on in further and higher education. Degree attainment rates grew for
both the richest and poorest 20%. They noted, however, that this rise differed across income groups. The
proportion of young people from the richest backgrounds increased from 20% to 46% while the proportion
of young people from the poorest backgrounds increased from 6% to 9% only. Thus, the participation rates
between the two groups widened from 14 to 37 percentage points over time (Blanden et al. 2005: 112).[3]
2.2 These ﬁndings were challenged by sociologists John Goldthorpe and Michelle Jackson (2007). They
emphasised that intergenerational income mobility is not the same as class mobility which takes account
of a class structure. Moreover, it is imperative to distinguish between absolute and relative mobility.
Absolute (or total) mobility captures mobility that ﬂow from structural changes as some classes grow in
size while others decline as a result of the changing occupational structure. Relative mobility concerns the
extent of ﬂuidity when changing structural conditions are held constant and captures the chances of people
from different classes of origin being found in one rather than another class of destination.
2.3 Applying a class structural approach (rather than examining income relativities using data divided into
quartiles as the economists do) to the same data sets as used by Blanden et al., Goldthorpe and Jackson
found different results. For men, absolute mobility had not been falling: total mobility increased slightly,
with a slight decrease in upward mobility and an increase in downward and horizontal mobility (Goldthorpe
and Jackson, 2007: 531). For women, absolute mobility experienced a minor change in total mobility, with
small increases in upward and horizontal mobility and a modest decrease in downward mobility (Goldthorpe
and Jackson, 2007: 532). Goldthorpe and Jackson explain these ﬁndings with reference to the changing
opportunity structure confronting the two cohorts.  For men, the rising rate of upward mobility from the
1940s to the 1960s started to ﬂatten out from the 1970s and downward mobility increased. For women,
there has been increasing upward mobility and decreasing downward mobility. Turning to relative rates of
mobility, they found no change, indicating that levels of ﬂuidity were unaltered between the two cohorts.
Overall, there may be some slackening off in upward mobility for men.  Contrary to the economists' view,
however, Goldthorpe and Jackson concluded that social mobility is not declining, or not as yet. 
2.4 Debate continues on methodological issues about the use of income versus class and the quality of
the data sets used (Blanden et al., 2008; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2009, 2010).[4] Goldthorpe has long
preferred the General Household Survey (GHS) (Goldthorpe and Mills, 2004). Recently, he and Mills have
extended their research into the 1990s and the 2000s by analysing national surveys conducted between
1972 and 2005 (Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008). Turning to men's absolute mobility, they found that total
mobility rates and upward and downward mobility rates were fairly stable throughout the period 1972-1992
and 1991-2005 (Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008: 88). In contrast, notable changes in women's absolute mobility
rates were found over the period in question. Total mobility was largely stable throughout the two periods.
There is a signiﬁcant increase in upward mobility while downward mobility decreased across the whole
period by similar percentages (Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008: 89). Once again, Goldthorpe and Mills note the
proportion of men in the professional and managerial class (salariat) grew steadily while the working class
shrunk throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. Most of the decline was among skilled manual workers. From
1991-2005, however, the salariat barely grew at all while the working class did not shrink any further
(Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008: 87). For women, different rates are evident because the proportion of women
in the salariat continued to grow (albeit at the lower levels) throughout the 1990s and up to 2005 and the
number of women in the unskilled working class declined (Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008: 86). Finally,
Goldthorpe and Mills found relative rates of mobility were constant over the forty-year time span for both
men and women.
2.5 These latest ﬁndings conﬁrm Goldthorpe's long-standing research on social mobility. He has
consistently argued that while absolute mobility increased for the second half of the twentieth century, as
the shape of the class structure changed, relative mobility did not change over that period (see also
Paterson and Iannelli 2007a, b for research on England, Scotland and Wales). This 'constant social ﬂuidity'
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/16/3/4.html 2 31/08/2011explains why class inequalities persist. These ﬁndings have not always been agreed by other sociologists,
however (Payne, 1987a, 1987b; Saunders, 1996 -- although see also Savage and Egerton, 1997; Breen
and Goldthorpe, 1999 with regard to Saunder's position). Most recently, on the basis of a cohort analysis of
data from the British Election Studies (BES), Heath and Payne (2000: 275) have conﬁrmed Goldthorpe's
ﬁndings on absolute mobility but suggested that relative mobility has seen a 'real, albeit small, increase in
the openness of British society'. Similarly, also using the BES data, Payne and Roberts (2002) have
argued British society has experienced periods of 'greater openness' over the last 60 years. Using data
from 31 contemporary social surveys and the Cambridge Family History dataset, Lambert et al. (2007)
have shown a small but slow linear trend towards increasing social mobility over the period 1800-2004.
This, academic debate amongst sociologists at least, has focused on whether relative social mobility has
improved although attention among politicians and public commentators is now turning to the current
debate on absolute mobility in 'new political circumstances' (Saunders, 2009: 7). From the research noted
above, Payne and Roberts (like the economists) have suggested that opportunities for upward mobility for
men decreased in the 1990s although Saunders argues that the apparent consensus that social mobility is
getting worse is a myth.
2.6 Returning to the speciﬁc debate on social mobility among economists and sociologists, the key
substantive difference between them is whether men's mobility, in both absolute and relative terms, is
declining (although economists are not much concerned about absolute mobility). The differences are not
as great as they ﬁrst seem. After all, Goldthorpe and Jackson found a (non-signiﬁcant) decline in absolute
upward mobility for men in the NCDS and BCS data sets. Indeed, in their earlier work analysing GHS data
between 1973 and 1992, Goldthorpe and Mills concluded, 'Among men, the previously rising trend in
upward mobility levelled out, and, if anything, started to decline, while the previously decreasing rate of
downward mobility levelled out or, if anything, increased' (Goldthorpe and Mills, 2004: 222). The different
ﬁndings, they indicate, may be associated with using unrepresentative cohort studies rather than
representative population surveys. Be that as it may, they acknowledge that 'trends observed across still
relatively young birth cohorts may point to changes that will become apparent in the total population at
some later stage, since changes in mobility are known to be often driven by cohort replacement, rather
than general period, effects' (Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008: 98). We take up this suggestion to see if changes
are taking place by extending Goldthorpe and Mills' work using the 1991 BHPS and the 2005 GHS to
examine social mobility among the general population at the two time points. Have trends in men's
absolute mobility got worse? Moreover, it is equally important to ask whether they have stayed the same
or become better. Similarly, have trends in women's absolute mobility patterns declined, stabilised or
increased? What are the main trends in relative social mobility for both men and women in recent times?
Have these got worse for men and women? Given the ongoing sociological debate, have they stayed the
same or improved?
Data and methods
3.1 As noted above, we use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for 1991 and the General
Household Survey (GHS) for 2005 in this study.[5] Both are national representative sample surveys for
respondents resident in private households in Great Britain at the time of interview and both have large
sample sizes. The BHPS began in 1991 as the premier British panel study, and had 5,143 households and
9,912 individuals with full interviews in that year, with a response rate of 92% at the individual level. The
GHS for 2005 has a full sample size of 30,069 among whom 72% are full interviews (6% being proxy and
22% child/other).[6] The overall response rate for the survey was 74%. We conﬁne the analysis to men and
women aged 25 to 59 in both surveys. This age range was chosen because the GHS for 2005 only
collected the information on the parental occupation from respondents aged 25 or above and this is also
the age range used in Goldthorpe and Mills (2008) so that we can compare our ﬁndings with theirs.
3.2 The most important reason for using these two surveys fourteen years apart is that they are the only
data sources currently available that have respondents' origin and destination occupational classes
consistently coded in the National Statistics Socio-economic Classiﬁcation (NS-SeC). For both
respondents' and parental class (indexed via their current or last main jobs or their parents' – father's and
mother's – jobs when they were at the age of 16), we use the thirty-ﬁve category long version of the NS-
SeC which is then coded into the seven-class schema as per Rose and Pevalin (2003: 8-10). As both male
and female respondents' and parental class codes are available in the long version, we follow the
suggestions by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 241) that, where possible, men and women in lower
intermediate class (routine non-manual in the lower grade, that is, Class IIIb in the Goldthorpe class or L7.2
in the 35-category long-version of the NS-SeC) be combined with unskilled manual working class.[7] We
also follow Erikson (1984) and adopt a 'dominance approach' by using father's or mother's class (whichever
is higher) as the family origin class.[8] This procedure has, in our view, two advantages. Firstly, it would
better reﬂect the social reality. The enlarging salariat class in the last few decades (see Goldthorpe and
Mills 2008: 86; Li, 2002; Garratt and Li, 2005: 203; Li and Heath, 2010: 85) can be expected to beneﬁt
mothers as well as fathers and, over time, there would be more households in which mothers had a higher
social position than fathers. This is shown in our data. For the samples used in the paper, 17.9% of
mothers were in a higher class than fathers in 1991 and the proportion rose to 23.5% in 2005. Second and
concomitantly, adopting this procedure rather than using father's class alone has increased the effective
sample sizes for analysis (by 296 for the BHPS and 651 for the GHS).[9] (For the ease of presentation, we
still use the term 'father's class' in some of the discussions below.) After selecting respondents with valid
origin and destination classes, we have 5,558 respondents for the 1991 and 8,380 respondents for the
2005 data.
3.3 The seven-class NS-SeC schema we use for both origin and destination classes are: (1) higher
managerial and professional and large employers, (2) lower managerial and professional, (3) intermediate,
(4) small employers and own account workers, (5) lower supervisory and technical, (6) semi-routine and (7)
routine (Rose and Pevalin, 2003: 13). In some of our discussion below, we shall refer to the ﬁrst two
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We conduct our analyses for men and women separately.
3.4 Before we proceed to the detailed analysis, it is necessary to have a brief look at the changing
contours of the class structure. Table 1 shows the distributions of the origin and the destination classes in
the two years and two summary indices which are listed at the bottom of the table. The dissimilarity index,
which shows the percentages of cases that would have to be reallocated to make the two distributions
identical, is a measure of overall change. According to this index, there were more changes in the origin
than in the men's class distributions between the two time points (12.9% and 9.2%) but women
experienced similar amounts of mobility to parents in the period covered. As the index of dissimilarity is
insensitive to the ordered data as implied in the NS-SeC class and to local changes and as it does not
provide any directional statement about the differences between the years, we also report the net difference
index (NDI)[10] as devised by Lieberson (1975) which can overcome shortcomings in the former. It is noted
here that the negative value imply that the 2005 distributions have a distinct edge over the 1991
distributions. As can be seen, parents and women experienced more class advancement than did men.
Notes:
1.  Weighted analyses and unweighted Ns are used in this and all following tables.
2.  For respondents aged 25 to 59 in Great Britain at time of survey (same below).
Source: The British Household Panel Survey (1991) and the General Household Survey
(2005) (same below).
3.5 Looking more closely, we ﬁnd growing proportions of the salariat (Classes 1-2) with regard to father's,
men's and women's class positions in the two surveys. In relation to father's class, there is an increase of
11.3 percentage points in the size of the salariat and a similar drop (by 8 points) in the intermediate
classes (Classes 3-5). The size of the working class (Classes 6-7) declined by 3.3 percentage points. In
relation to men's class, the same trends are broadly discernible. There is a 6.5 point increase in the size of
the salariat and a 5.5 point drop in the intermediate classes while the working-class decrease in size is
slight (by 0.9 points). With regard to women, there is a substantial increase (by 10.2 points) in the size of
the salariat which is bigger than that for men and similar to the changes in father's class over the fourteen-
year period. There is a signiﬁcant drop in the size of the intermediate class (by 7.5 points) and a small
decrease in the size of the working class (by 2.9 points).[11]
3.6 Thus, in all three cases, the changes in the size of the different classes result from growths in the
proportions found in the salariat which are mostly offset by declining proportions in the intermediate and the
working classes. In other words, there was a continued upgrading of the class structure for both origin and
destination classes in the period in question. Such ﬁndings are in line with those reported in other studies
(Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2007; Goldthorpe and Mills, 2004, 2008; Heath and Payne, 2000). What is not
usually reported but would be expected is that, if the respondents' class undergoes continued upgrading as
has occurred since the early 1970s, parental class would experience a similar kind of structural changes. A
more familiar ﬁnding, of course, is the persistent gender differences in the position of men and women in
different class locations (Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008, Marshall et al., 1988).[12]
3.7 To proceed further and in line with a class structural approach, we analyse patterns and trends in social
mobility by making a crucial distinction between absolute and relative mobility long used by social mobility
researchers as noted above (Goldthorpe, 1987; Halsey et al., 1980; Heath, 1981). As we shall see later,
public concern about social mobility tends to focus on absolute mobility while mobility researchers (or
sociologists at least) study both absolute and relative mobility. 
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Total rates
4.1 We consider absolute mobility in terms of total rates ﬁrst. We present our tables in the same way as
Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007). Tables II and III are origins-by-destinations tables for men and women
respectively. Cell values are percentages of the total sample of respondents from each of the two surveys.
The black cells on the main diagonals of the tables indicate immobility. The light grey cells show upward
mobility, the dark grey cells denote downward mobility and the white cells capture horizontal mobility.
Summary statistics at the bottom of each table show levels of total, upward, downward and horizontal
mobility across the two samples. Total mobility, as the term suggests, is the sum of these three different
types of mobility. As we noted above, it can conceal movements which are only revealed when total
mobility is disaggregated into its constituent parts. We add an additional feature to our summary statistics,
namely, the percentage change in the different types of mobility between 1991 and 2005. We also show the
results of signiﬁcance tests for the changes. The advantage is to see, at a glance, patterns of continuity
and change over a 14-year period.
4.2 Turning to men ﬁrst, Table II shows a tiny increase in total mobility from 77.4% to 78.2% which is
insigniﬁcant. Men's total mobility rates are, therefore, largely unchanged over the period in question. The
disaggregation of total mobility into its constituent parts reveals important changes, however. Upward
mobility has decreased by 3 percentage points (from 43.6% to 40.6%) and this change is signiﬁcant.
Downward mobility has increased signiﬁcantly by 5.3 percentage points (from 26.0% to 31.3%). Finally,
horizontal mobility has signiﬁcantly decreased by 1.5 percentage points (from 7.8% to 6.3%). These
ﬁndings are basically similar to Goldthorpe and Jackson's ﬁndings from their analysis of the NCDS and
BCS data. The main difference between our and their data is the higher level of downward mobility based
on our population-level analysis. This summary evidence suggests that men's upward mobility is declining.
Interestingly, there is an increase in downward mobility for men, a ﬁnding often overlooked in the academic
and public debate about social mobility.
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* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (the same in the following tables).
4.3 Looking at the more detailed ﬁndings in the table, immobility within the professional and managerial
salariat (Classes 1 and 2) plays a larger part in total immobility in 2005 than in 1991 while the opposite is
found within the working class (Classes 6 and 7) between the two time points. There has been a drop
among the intermediate classes (Class 3, 4 and 5). There has also been a decrease in short-range mobility
at the bottom of the class structure: namely, from Class 7 (routine workers) up into Class 6 (semi-routine
workers) and from Classes 7 and 6 into Class 5 (manual supervisors and lower technicians). Interestingly,
despite the decline in upward mobility, there is still evidence of a modest increase in long-range upward
mobility from Classes 6 and 7 into Classes 1 and 2 between 1992 and 2005. This kind of mobility has not
disappeared but has gained some increase. With regard to downward mobility, evidence of this can be
seen across the class structure although it is most notable within the salariat (from Class 1 to Class 2) and
from Class 2 (lower grade professions and managers) to Classes 6 and 7 (so long-range downward mobility
into the working classes).
4.4 Looking now to women, Table III shows a slight increase (0.8 percentage points) in total mobility (from
77.6% to 78.4%), which is insigniﬁcant. Yet, the disaggregation of total mobility into the constituent parts
reveals that important change has occurred. Upward mobility increased signiﬁcantly (by 4.9 percentage
points) rising from 31.0% to 35.9%. Downward mobility decreased slightly (from 37.4% to 36.9%) but this
is insigniﬁcant. Finally, horizontal mobility decreased by 3.4 percentage points (from 9.1% to 5.7%) and
this change is signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings are somewhat different to Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007) where
they found a smaller increase in upward and horizontal mobility and a bigger decrease in downward
mobility. They are in line, however, with Goldthorpe and Mill's (2008: Figure 5) subsequent work on
intergenerational class mobility. Although we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in downward mobility, we
found a substantial increase in upward mobility as they did.
4.5 A detailed examination of Table III reveals that immobility in the professional and managerial salariat
(Classes 1 and 2) rose between 1991 and 2005 while immobility declined in the intermediate and the
working classes (Classes 3-7). With regard to the substantial increase in upward social mobility, there is
clear evidence of long-range and short-range mobility into the salariat over the two samples. It should be
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making the way into Class 1 within the salariat. There appears to be some movement from unskilled
manual origins into skilled manual destinations. Small increases in downward mobility are found scattered
across the cells although the biggest increase is found from Class 1 to Class 6.
Outﬂow rates
4.6 We now turn our attention to absolute mobility in terms of outﬂow rates as shown in Tables IV and V
based on the same data as found in Tables II and III. The difference, however, is that the cell values are
percentages of row marginals. These tables, therefore, show how men and women of particular class
origins (as deﬁned by their father's class position as before) were distributed to class destinations in each
of the two samples. It is standard practice in mobility research to look closely at the marginal distributions
in the columns ﬁrst of all. These show the overall class distribution of respondents of the two surveys.
They highlight the changing class structure and the opportunities facilitating or constraining mobility that
are independent of an individual's class origins. In other words, looking at the data in this way allows us to
consider the structural conditions under which individuals may or may not be mobile and to acknowledge
that these conditions are far from static but are constantly changing over time.
4.7 Concentrating on men ﬁrst, the column marginal distributions show some changes in the size of the
different classes across the two samples. In 1991, 16% of all men aged 25-59 were found in Class 5. By
2005, this percentage had dropped to 12%. Similarly, in the earlier sample, 15% of men were found in
Class 4 (self-employed workers) compared with 12% in the later sample. Thus, the major decreases in size
occurred among the intermediate classes (which dropped from 35% to 28% of all men). These decreases
are offset by increases across all the other classes with the modest but biggest increase to be found in
Class 1: from 16% to 20% over the 14-year period. Overall, there is an increase (by 7 percentage points) in
the proportion of men found in the salariat, growing from 38% to 45%, while there was also no change in
the proportion of men in the working classes, which stayed at 27%.
4.8 Looking closely at the cell values in Table IV, the outﬂow rates mostly reﬂect differences in the sizes of
the classes illustrated by the column marginal distributions. Thus, there are fewer men of most social
origins to be found in Classes 4 and 5. That said, there has been a marked decline in men from unskilled
manual origins (Class 7) able to secure positions in supervisory manual positions since only 16% of men
are to be found in Class 5 in the 2005 sample as against 22% in the 1991 sample. There is also a
considerable drop in the intergenerational stability of men in Class 4 (the self-employed) with only 17% of
men found in this class in 2005 compared with 26% in 1991. Finally, in relation to the changing size of
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/16/3/4.html 7 31/08/2011Class 1, the main increases are to be found in the cells in the lower left hand corner of the tables: namely,
from Classes 5, 6 and 7 (technician, supervisors of manual workers and skilled and unskilled manual)
origins.
4.9 Turning now to women, the column marginal distributions show important changes in the size of the
different classes across the two samples. In 1991, just under a ﬁfth (19%) of all women aged 25-59 were to
be found in Class 3 (routine non-manual employees). By 2005, this percentage had dropped to 14%. The
overall size of the intermediate classes dropped from 32% in 1992 to 24% in 2005, a decrease by 8
percentage points. These decreases are offset by increases in the higher and lower echelons of the
salariat, up from 4% to 9% for Class 1 and from 25% to 30% for Class 2. Accordingly, the proportion of
women to be found in the salariat grew from 29% in 1991 to 39% in 2005. Women still very much dominate
lower professional, managerial and administrative positions however. The proportion of women in Class 6
also grew (from 19% to 22%) but that in Class 7 declined (from 21% to 15%). The overall effect of this two-
way change was to see a modest decrease in the proportion of women found in working-class positions
(from 40% to 37%).
4.10 Focusing on the cell values in Table V, the outﬂow rates mostly reﬂect differences in the sizes of the
classes illustrated by the column marginal distributions. Thus, there are fewer women of all social origins
alike to be found in Class 3 and 7. Of note is the marked decline in intergenerational stability between
fathers of Class 3 and daughters of Class 3 which dropped from 27% to 16% between 1991 and 2005. A
pattern of decline, albeit to a smaller extent, is found in Classes 4-7. On the other hand, there has been a
marked increase in intergenerational stability between fathers and daughters in Class 1 (up from 11% to
18%) and an increase (albeit to a smaller extent) of intergenerational stability in Class 2 as well (from 35%
to 39%). Also notable is the increasing mobility of women of all social origins enjoying mobility into Class
1. Despite the increasing proportion of women to be found in Class 2, one exceptional ﬁnding is the decline
in the proportion of women of Class 1 origins to be found in Class 2 (down by 14 percentage points from
51% to 37%). Otherwise, the increasing proportion of women in Class 2 comes from women of other social
origins.
4.11 To be sure, ﬁndings from two national surveys over a fourteen year time span have their limitations for
illuminating trends in intergenerational class mobility over a longer time frame. Nevertheless, this analysis
reveals mobility trends within the population as a whole in recent decades. With regard to men, the results
suggest that upward mobility may indeed be declining. It is these ﬁndings, of course, that have attracted
the attention and concern of politicians and media pundits. That said, the evidence also shows that long-
range upward mobility from working-class positions into the salariat has actually increased, albeit to a
small extent, a ﬁnding which has been often overlooked. Moreover, downward mobility is increasing and
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upward mobility, most notably into the salariat, although we found that this trend is not necessarily being
accompanied with an increase in downward mobility. Thus, while men's mobility (in terms of absolute
upward and downward mobility) appears to be getting worse, women's mobility seems to be improving over
time.
Relative mobility rates
5.1 Having looked at absolute mobility in some detail, we now turn to relative mobility. Relative mobility
refers to the competition of people from different origin classes for one rather than another class
destination and is expressed as odds ratios. Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, a class structure
with only two origin and two destination classes: middle- and working- classes. If half of the people from
the middle, and half from the working, origin classes are found in the middle class destinations with the
other half found in the working class destinations, we have an odds ratio of 1. In such a case, there are
equal chances of class mobility. In other words, there is no association between origin and destination. The
closer the odds ratio is to 1, the weaker the association and hence the greater equality in social mobility
while the further away the odds ratio rises above 1, the stronger the association and the greater the
inequality. In a similar vein, the further away the odds ratio fall below 1, the weaker the association and the
greater the equality. Relative mobility thus taps the net association between origin and destination,
independent of the structural changes as reﬂected in the marginal distributions.
5.2 Two statistical models are usually used for relative mobility analysis: the loglinear and the log-
multiplicative layer effect (also called 'uniform difference' or UNIDIFF) models (Goldthorpe, 1987; Erikson
and Goldthorpe, 1992; Xie, 1992). The loglinear model is subdivided into a baseline (or conditional
independence) model and a constant social ﬂuidity (CSF) model.[13] Brieﬂy, the baseline model assumes
that the distributions of both origins and destinations vary by the time of survey (year) but there is no
association between them. In other words, all the odds ratios or relative chances deﬁning origin and
destination classes are equal at a value of one. The CSF model allows for the latter association but does
not allow for the three-way association, which would be a saturated model. The UNIDIFF model is a variant
of the CSF model which further allows for a uniform movement for the coefﬁcient of one year to move
above or below that of the other. In the present analysis, we use 1991 as the reference point. Thus the
further away the coefﬁcient for 2005 is above that of 1991, the more unequal is the society becoming, and
vice versa.
Note: rG2 = Percentage reduction in G2;   = Percentage of cases misclassiﬁed.
5.3 Table VI shows the results of ﬁtting the loglinear and the UNIDIFF models to the mobility tables for
men and women in 1991 and 2005. For men, the CSF model gives a poor ﬁt to the data. The UNIDIFF
model gives a statistically signiﬁcant improvement in ﬁt over the CSF model. The estimated parameter for
2005 was 0.97, indicating a slight but signiﬁcant increase in ﬂuidity. This ﬁnding is in line with that by
Goldthorpe and Mills (2008: 92) where they ﬁnd a somewhat more salient effect (by a factor of 0.86). In the
case of women, neither CSF nor UNIDIFF model gives an acceptable ﬁt to the data according to the
conventional criterion, but the latter does make a signiﬁcant improvement in ﬁt over the former.
5.4 Thus, for both men and women, the evidence suggests some increasing social ﬂuidity over the period
covered even though the extent of the increase is rather small. The ﬁndings here are somewhat at odds
with the 'no-change' result on the individual level data as reported by Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007: Table
VI), but are in line with the result on the 'complete' tables (conjugal households) as reported by Goldthorpe
and Mills (2008: Table 4). They are also in line with studies using the semi-cohort methods (Heath and
Payne, 2000) and those reported in Lambert et al. (2007). While the degree of importance to be attached to
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the localised pattern (as we shall soon see), the more important point here is that our ﬁndings are rather
different from the declining (relative) mobility as reported by Blanden et al. (2005: Figure 2).
Notes:
1.  Signiﬁcance tests are conducted for pairs of odds ratios between the two time points: 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
2.  The sums of odds ratios are 93.7 and 60.4 for men, and 139.5 and 60.7 for women in
1991 and 2005, with the ratios falling by 35.5% and 56.5%.
5.5 As the patterns revealed in the loglinear models are of a generalised kind, we show, in Table VII, sets
of symmetrical odds ratios derived from Tables IV and V that involve the same pair of origin and
destination classes. This will allow us to see more clearly than hitherto the possible changes that occur of
a local kind as signalled in outﬂow tables discussed earlier. We also show results of signiﬁcance tests for
the pairs so that signiﬁcant changes can be captured at a glance.
5.6 Three features are noticeable. First, for men and women alike, the odds ratios involving Class 4
declined from 1991 to 2005, some signiﬁcantly so, indicating a declining propensity in intergenerational
immobility in this class. The pattern in this regard gives support to the ﬁnding reported in Goldthorpe and
Jackson (2007: 538) although the magnitude of the odds ratios in our table, especially for men, is smaller
than what they ﬁnd in their cohort data. Secondly, we ﬁnd, with regard to long-range mobility, that is, odds
ratios involving Class 1 and the working classes (6 and 7), a substantial reduction in Class 1 advantages
over time. In this respect, our results provide no support to the ﬁndings based on the cohort analysis as
reported in Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007: 538). For instance, Goldthorpe and Jackson report increasing
odds ratios involving Classes 1 and 6 for men and women,[14] but we ﬁnd markedly declining odds ratios in
both cases. Thirdly, the overall patterns in the changes of the odds ratios for men and women is that of a
decline (16 out of 21 pair for men and 19 out of 21 pairs for women) indicating narrowing social distances
between the origin classes in their children's mobility competitions. In sum, the results show a generally
declining propensity of intergenerational immobility in self-employment accompanied both by a sharp
reduction in the advantage of the higher salariat over the working classes and by a generally weakening
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association between origin and destination classes over time.[15]
Public discussion on social mobility
6.1 How do our ﬁndings relate to the debate to the current public debate as to whether social mobility is
really declining or not? In terms of men's absolute mobility, the prevailing view that total mobility is
declining has no support but upward mobility has declined between 1991 and 2005. If the ﬁndings are a
portent of the future, it is understandable that politicians and media pundits are concerned. After all, public
debate on social mobility tends to focus on absolute upward mobility as part of a widespread desire of
parents to see their children do better than themselves (Devine, 2004). Interestingly, attention has not
focused on the signiﬁcant increase in downward mobility among men. Of course, this trend could be
interpreted in different ways depending on different preoccupations. Academics may welcome increasing
downward mobility as evidence of a meritocracy. Middle-class parental concern about the downward
mobility of sons, however, may well contribute to public anxiety about trends in men's social mobility
overall. Thus, it is not wholly surprising that politicians, media commentators and the public to whom they
speak are concerned about the decline in men's absolute upward social mobility. Policy makers are right to
be concerned with the life chances of working-class men, and they also voice the concerns, perhaps quite
unawares, of the middle class when they talk about the rise in men's downward mobility.
6.2 In relation to women's absolute mobility, the consensus opinion about declining total mobility is not
supported by the evidence either. On the contrary, upward mobility has increased signiﬁcantly with
evidence of short-range and long-range mobility. Downward mobility has declined but only by a tiny
amount. It should not be forgotten, however, that while upward mobility clearly outweighs downward
mobility for men (40.6% compared with 31.3% in 2005), the same is not true for women. Rather, downward
mobility is slightly higher than upward mobility among women (36.8% compared with 35.9%). Despite the
positive change over a 14-year period, women are still less likely to be upwardly mobile and more likely to
be downwardly mobile than men. These ﬁndings conﬁrm previous work on women's working lives (Dex,
1987, 2003). Moreover, we would add a note of caution to the idea that men and women are now directly
competing with each other in the job market and that men may be coming off worse in the competition for
good jobs (Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008: 95). After all, men still dominate top jobs in the higher salariat
(Class 1). There may be more competition for lower salariat jobs (Class 2) but it is highly likely that men
and women do different jobs within this class category. After all, gender segregation persists with, for
example, men much less likely to enter the teaching and nursing professions than women (Marshall et al.
1998; Devine, 2010). Moreover, the life chances of working-class women should not be overlooked in
public debate and policy making.
6.3 Public debate about mobility rarely focuses on relative mobility while academics see unchanging
patterns of social ﬂuidity as a major 'mobility problem' in stratiﬁcation research and, indeed, as the major
problem for politicians and policy makers to address (Goldthorpe, 1987; Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2007;
Goldthorpe and Mills, 2004, 2008). Politicians may want Britain to be a meritocracy but rarely acknowledge
that a genuine meritocracy involves both upward and downward mobility where the link between origins and
destinations is broken. Of course, downward mobility is not something middle-class parents desire when
they want their children to do as well as, if not better than, themselves in education and employment
(Goldthorpe, 2007; Devine, 2004). Somewhat more optimistic than Goldthorpe and his colleagues although
in line with Heath and Payne (2000),[16] Payne and Roberts (2002) and Lambert et al. (2007), we found
some positive signs of greater social ﬂuidity with regard to men's and women's social mobility at both
general and local levels. That is to say, the chances of middle-class children securing middle-class, and
avoiding working-class, jobs have declined relative to the chances of working-class children in the same
kind of competition. Contrary to the picture on absolute mobility, this is a 'good news story' for working-
class children but it is a 'bad news story' for middle-class children. Thus, these empirical ﬁndings on
relative mobility pose something of a dilemma for politicians and policy makers who want to please both
working-class and middle-class parents because working-class gains have been made with middle-class
losses.
6.4 Turning to the position of women, we ﬁnd that, despite the substantial increase of absolute upward
mobility noted earlier in the paper, women are as divided by class as men (Marshall et al. 1988) and are
more concentrated in the lower echelon of the salariat. The chances of middle-class daughters securing
middle-class careers are better than working-class daughters. To be sure, it is good news that middle-class
daughters are now more likely than in the past to become, for example, doctors and lawyers (like their
fathers) than teachers, nurses and secretaries for instance (like their mothers). What is regrettable,
however, is that working-class daughters do not have the chances to forge such high-level careers and if
they enjoy no mobility at all, they are conﬁned to low-level service work in shops and care work, for
example, which are poorly paid and have limited career prospects. Overall, while many middle-class
women have enjoyed opportunities for advancement in education and employment, working-class women
have not done so to the same extent. To repeat, the disadvantaged position of working-class women
should not be overlooked in the public debate by politicians and academics.
Conclusion
7.1 In this paper, we have sought to contribute to the ongoing debate among economists and sociologists
on patterns and trends of social mobility in contemporary Britain. Using the best data containing mobility
information on the general population, namely, the BHPS (1991) and the GHS (2005), we have extended
existing research by Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007) and Goldthorpe and Mills (2008). We focused our
attention less on unchanging total rates, which conceal rather than reveal, and paid more attention to
changing rates of upward and downward mobility. When unchanging total rates are disaggregated, the
results show that men's upward mobility is on the decline (although long-range upward mobility is
somewhat increased). While the decline is small at the moment, the trend may be a warning of things to
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life chances of young men (notably working-class men) growing up in uncertain economic times and
especially when men's downward mobility is increasing too. It is a shame, however, that such concern
does not extend to the life chances of working-class women who also face difﬁcult times to improve their
lives.
7.2 Of course, public debate about social mobility is largely preoccupied with absolute mobility and, even
more speciﬁcally, with absolute upward mobility. This is why the Labour government's report, Unleashing
Aspiration, placed a considerable emphasis on a substantial growth in the professions in creating 'a second
wave of social mobility' (p. 26) in the near future' and emphasised the importance of education in securing
good jobs. Now adopted by the Coalition government, this preoccupation with upward social mobility
facilitated by major structural change may be somewhat galling for academic sociologists who place a high
premium on the distinction between absolute and relative mobility and are exasperated that most
politicians and media commentators do not acknowledge that a genuine meritocracy involves downward
mobility as well as upward mobility on the basis of merit. To be sure, the way in which the debate is
conducted could be dismissed as purely political. We would argue, however, that it is more constructive to
recognise that politicians, policy makers, media pundits and, most importantly, voting parents have
different preoccupations to academic researchers on social mobility. Upward mobility, rather than downward
mobility, is the name of the game. The ongoing challenge for social scientists of whatever discipline is to
understand how and why the debate on social mobility is conducted in the way that it is and to contribute
to discussions of policy that improve the life chances of working-class men and women in the lower
echelons of the class structure in contemporary Britain.
Notes
1We are most grateful to John Goldthorpe, Anthony Heath, Colin Mills, Geoff Payne and Mike Savage for
their very insightful critiques and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. We are also very grateful
to the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments. All errors in the paper remain the
responsibility of the authors.
2Labour, now in opposition, defended its record in ofﬁce, noting the growing proportion of poor teenagers
who go to university compared with more afﬂuent young people (The Guardian 28/12/10). Not a week goes
by, it seems, when a politician does not discuss social mobility and it has certainly loomed large in the
latest political controversy over the abolition of the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMAs) and
university tuition fees. A cursory search of 'social mobility' on the internet produces a vast amount of
commentary on the topic where one can ﬁnd opinions and comments ranging from The Spectator to
Mumsnet. Payne (2010) and Saunders (2010) appear to have best kept on top of the political and policy
debates to date. Arguably, the salience of social mobility has risen because it became, ﬁrst, a way of the
last Labour Government, under the (then) new leadership of Gordon Brown, renewing its commitment to
equality and fairness and, second, the Coalition Government challenging Labour's record in ofﬁce with
regard to these issues since its election in May 2010.
3This interdisciplinary interest, straddling the divide between economists and sociologists, in
intergenerational social mobility is welcome. Ongoing work by Blanden and Gregg, who are now joined by
Lindsey Macmillan, should continue to be of interest to sociologists. For example, in a recent working
paper, Gregg and Macmillan's analysis of BHPS data has found that the gradient of educational attainment
at aged 16 by family background has decreased across generations of young people growing up in the
1970s in comparison to those grown up in the 1980s and the 1990s. They wonder whether this decline in
educational inequalities could see an improvement in social mobility. As they rightly point out, much
depends on the fate of these young people as they enter the labour market, which they will have done in
the 1990s and the 2000s at a time of growing income inequalities (Gregg and MacMillan, 2009).
4This paper focuses on the substantive debate about whether social mobility is declining. We do not
engage here in the more technical, methodological, debate about the use of income versus class variables
to measure social mobility. It is worthy of note that economists, like sociologists, do not always agree with
each other. For example, a number of economists have used income measures but have come to different
conclusions on patterns and trends in social mobility to Blanden and her colleagues (Francesconi and
Nicoletti, 2006; Ermisch and Nicoletti, 2007; Nicoletti, 2008).
5The reason for using the datasets is due to data consistency on parental and respondents' class. It would
be ideal to include more data points for this analysis but our checking proved to be of no avail. For
example, the sample sizes in the BGES are too small for our detailed analysis and do not have the NS-
SeC class. The Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (1993/4) has good sample sizes but contains
no information on father's job. The Family and Working Life Survey (1996/7) has father's class but it is
coded in Social Grades A-E which is incompatible with that used in this paper. The Taking Part survey
(2005/6) has a large sample size but pertains to England and Wales only rather than to the whole of Britain.
The sample sizes in the British component of the European Social Survey are too small for yearly
analysis. It is also noted here that the NS-SeC parental class in BHPS 1991 has been constructed by the
BHPS team at the Institute for Socio-Economic Research, University of Essex, and the ﬁles containing the
variables can be directly downloaded from the UK Data Archive.
6The GHS is the longest standing government annual survey (with breaks in some years) starting in 1972
with around twenty to thirty thousand respondents each year. From 1972 to 1992, it contains information on
the respondents' father's class but this information was not collected in the subsequent 12 years.
Furthermore, the Social Economic Groups (SEGs) from which the Goldthorpe class is derived has, in the
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impossible to differentiate between the higher and the lower salariat, and between the salariat and small
employers. In 2005, as the integration into the GHS of the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
Survey (EU-SILC), information on parental occupation was collected again, and in sufﬁcient detail to allow
for a direct comparison with the BHPS in terms of the parental and the respondents' NS-SeC class. The
NS-SeC is a new instantiation of the well-known Goldthorpe class schema.
7We deviate here from Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007) who only combined women in lower intermediate
class (Class IIIb in the Goldthorpe class schema) with unskilled manual workers on the grounds that men
are rarely found in such jobs. Further analysis shows that, for the samples used in this paper, a similar
proportion of fathers and mothers were found in this class (2.7% of fathers and 2.4% of mothers in the
BHPS, and 2.6% of fathers and 2.7% of mothers in the GHS). Male respondents were less likely to be
found in this class than female respondents but the proportions were not negligible (2.9% and 3.3% of men
as against 4.2% and 5.7% of women in the two surveys respectively). Given this, it is reasonable, we
believe, to combine respondents and parents of both sexes in the class with the routine working class in a
similar way.
8In the GHS for 2005, respondents' and parents' jobs are coded to the 2002 Standard Occupational
Classiﬁcation (SOC). There are 322 SOC codes for fathers (soc2kf) and 245 codes for mothers (soc2km)
in the ﬁle which are match-coded into the 35-category long version of the Socio-economic Classiﬁcations
(SECs) using the respondents' SOC (soc2000). After the parental SECs in the GHS were coded, all the
SECs in the two ﬁles were recoded consistently into the 7-class NS-SeC schema, with SEC 7.2 for the
lower intermediate class combined with the routine manual workers (Class 7 in the 7-class NS-SeC). Since
the 2002 SOCs are better revised than the 1991 SOCs upon which the NS-SeC in BHPS 1991 was based,
one might expect the NS-SeC in the GHS as being better implemented. While some incompatibility might
be entailed, the coding procedures we adopted in the construction of the class variables are, we believe,
the best possible effort for comparability.
9We also ran the analysis using father's class and the main patterns are the same as using the dominance
class but owing to the smaller sample sizes, some of the analyses, especially in Table VII, are less stable.
All tables using father's class are available on request from the authors.
10The NDI is deﬁned as NDxy = pr(X > Y) – pr(Y > X), which is further deﬁned as 
 where, in our case, X indicates the class distributions in 1991 and Y indicates the
class distributions in 2005. It is noted here that, following the example of Liberson (1975), we reversed the
order in the calculation of the NDI such that 1 refers to routine class and 7 to higher salariat.
11The NDI, not shown in the table, between men and women fell from 11.3 to 8.9 between the two time
points.
12We have checked the results of women's class distribution in the GHS against that in the Labour Force
Survey (LFS) in 2005 for women in the same age groups in Britain. The distributions in Classes 1, 2 and 6
are, for example, almost identical (9.2%, 31.9% and 19.7% in the LFS respectively). Note that we have
coded the lower intermediate into Class 7 in the GHS, which cannot be done in the LFS but the overall
distribution in Classes 3 and 7 (29.1% in the GHS) is similar to that in the LFS (27.2%).
13The models can be written as:
where O stands for class origin, D for class destination, Y for year of survey. In the UNIDIFF model, Xij
indicates the general pattern of the origin-destination association, and ?k the direction and the relative
strength of this association speciﬁc to a year.
14The results reported in Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007: 538) involving odds ratios for Class 1 and
Classes 6&7 competitions for both men and women suggest support for the arguments of a declining
social mobility by Blanden and her colleagues. Further analysis on their data shows that the changes in the
odds ratios involving Classes 1 and 6&7 are not signiﬁcant for men but are signiﬁcant in both cases for
women at the 5% levels.
15In the last regard, we refer to the overall tendency rather than to statistical signiﬁcant per se although in
11 of the pairs compared the change are signiﬁcant at the 5% level (and in a further 4 cases, the changes
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16The use of quasi-cohort analysis, as Goldthorpe and Mills (2004: 207) point out, has the difﬁculty in
identifying the true trends of ﬂuidity. That is, with this method, the dating of the destination class of the
respondents in the same cohort is highly variable, which makes it impossible to work out the population
level of ﬂuidity at a particular time point.
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